1 The notation PA(S) is due to Kaye 1991 . It is worth mentioning that an ambiguity arises concerning what is meant, in defining the satisfaction-theoretic extension, by 'adding' the new axioms which contain new vocabulary. The ambiguity is whether to expand the induction scheme in PA to include formulas containing Sat L (x, y) . It turns out that if induction is not expanded (which is arguably 'unnatural'), then PA + satisfaction axioms is a conservative extension . However, if induction is expanded, so inductive proofs involving the formulas containing Sat L and Tr L can be formalized, then the extension PA + satisfaction axioms is a non-conservative extension, and indeed, this is the theory we refer to as PA(S). The non-conservativeness is witnessed by the fact that PA(S)g Con(PA).
(In fact, the system PA(S) is fully intertranslatable with a certain subsystem of second-order arithmetic called ACA ('Arithmetic Comprehension Axiom'). See Halbach 1999) . 2 The crux of the matter is that it can be shown that PA (S) Introduce within this theory the truth predicate Tr L (x), governed by the explicit definition,
The idea is that Sat L (x,y) expresses the satisfaction relation between (codes of) L-formulas and (codes of) sequences. 3 Then Tr L (x) expresses the concept of truth for such L sentences. It can be shown that this theory satisfies Tarski's Convention T: i.e.,
for each closed formula ϕ of L. This syntactic looking fact has a nice model-theoretic corollary. Let (M, S, Tr) be any model of PA(S). Let #ϕ be the gödel number of the L-formula ϕ. Then the fact (2) entails that, for any closed L-formula ϕ, 
To return to the main point, there is an L-formula Sen L (x) which strongly defines within PA(S) the (recursive) set of codes of closed L-formulas. That is,
Furthermore, the definition (1) of Tr L (x) guarantees that the following holds:
3 Normally, the metatheory requires a certain amount of set theory. However, only finite sequences are needed to recursively define satisfaction for first-order languages, all of whose formulas contain only finitely many variables. The reason is that the class of finitesequencesofnaturalnumbersiscountableandrecursive:thuseachsuchsequence can be coded (in an effective manner) as a number. Then a predicate Seq(x) strongly defining this set can be defined in PA. Thus, we assume that the sole new concept introduced into PA(S) is the concept expressed by satisfaction predicate Sat L (x, y).
F(S). The analogous result is that F(S)g dash True(F). It is clear that this is a proper extension of F, because F(S)g Con(F).
I do not know whether the strength of such systems have been examined in any more detail. Incidentally, it is known that PA(S)g PH, the Paris-Harrington formula which is famously not a theorem of PA. See Kaye 1991. a proof of the (strengthened) liar formula 3
Next, think about the Diagonalization Lemma (or Fixed Point Theorem). The system PA(S) satisfies the requirements of this theorem (it is an extension of Robinson Arithmetic Q). Thus, there must be a fixed point formula λ such that,
The analysis of the proof of the Diagonalization Lemma 4 shows that this formula λ must contain the new predicate Tr L (x). Indeed, because the truth-in-L predicate Tr L (x) cannot, by Tarski's Indefinability Theorem, be defined in PA, it follows that such a formula is not a closed L-formula (and is not logically equivalent to or logically interdeducible with any Lformula). Thus, λ must be an L S formula.
This formula λ is the formal analogue of the so-called 'strengthened liar' for our formalized semantical system PA(S). It is a formula that 'says of itself that it is not true'. But what does 'true' mean here? Well, it has to mean 'true-in-L'. Intuitively, this claim is, in fact, correct: i.e., λ is, in fact, not true-in-L. Thus, λ is, in fact, true (in L S ). This is, in effect, Tarski's own resolution of the liar paradox (including the strengthened liar).
We shall use the above facts (5) - (8) to deduce something rather interesting. Namely, that the strengthened liar formula λ is a theorem of PA(S). Thus, λ is provably true-in-L S ! The required proof that the formula λ is a theorem of PA(S) is triviality itself. Since, as we noted, λ is not a closed Lformula, we can deduce from (6) that,
and thus, from (8), (11) PA g λ This interesting result deserves further comment. Intuitively, PA(S) is in fact true (it is certainly true in the standard expansion (ᑨ,S,Tr) 5 of the intended structure ᑨ). It follows that λ is, in fact, true (or, if you like, it holds in (ᑨ,S,Tr)). Furthermore, it follows that ¬Tr L («λ») is also true! This correctly expresses the fact that the L S -formula λ is in fact not true in L: it is not true in L for the rather trivial 'syntactic' reason that λ is not equivalent to any L-formula. Indeed, it turns out that the λ's code -the number #λ -cannot be an element of Tr, for this set is constrained by the definition of Tr L (x) given above ((1)) to be a subset of the set (of codes) of closed L-formulas. The formula λ is the formal equivalent for our formal system PA(S) of the strengthened liar, which allegedly 'says of itself that it is not a true sentence'. But, in our study, this claim is actually true. The strengthened liar sentence λ is not even a sentence of L, and is a fortiori not a true sentence of L. However, λ is, in fact, a true sentence of the extended language L S and is, in fact, provable in PA(S).
